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FOOD RETAILERS AS DRIVERS FOR FOOD SAFETY STANDARDS 
 
Tetty Havinga* 
 
Abstract 
This chapter discusses the increased role of retailers in global food safety regulation and its 
consequences for food producers. The first section deals with the development of retail-driven 
private food safety regulation from the 1990s onwards. The dominant transnational retail-
driven standards are introduced with particular attention to the dissemination outside Europe 
and to the power of retailers in the governance structure of the standards. The next section 
discusses the reasons for retailers to engage in food safety standards. Subsequently, section 3 
deals with the reasons for food producers to comply with food safety standards. 
 
Key words 
Food safety; food standard; retailer; supermarket; regulation; private regulation 
1. THE EMERGENCE AND DISSEMINATION OF RETAIL-DRIVEN 
FOOD SAFETY REGULATION 
Looking at the global system of food regulation we see a shift from national 
law to law of the European Union and other transnational governmental or-
ganisations and from public to private governance. In the 1980s in most West-
ern European countries food regulation was mainly the domain of the national 
(or local) government and governmental food inspectorates. Several develop-
ments form the background for both transitions. Food supply chains became 
increasingly international promoted by faster and cheaper transportation, im-
proved techniques for preservation and cooling of fresh food and growing 
public purchasing power. Several food scares and incidents (such as BSE, dioxin 
in chicken and milk, and salmonella infections) created public concern about 
food safety and pressure on governments to tighten up regulations and en-
forcement. In addition, governmental regulation has been criticised for being 
inefficient and ineffective and taking the wheel from citizens and businesses. A 
final development that has contributed to the changing food governance sys-
tem is the increased power of multinational food retailers. 
The growing role of retailers in food governance is significant in various 
analyses of the development of food regulation. Marsden c.s. (2010) distin-
guish three phases in the development of food safety regulation in the UK since 
the 1980s: 1) state-centered regulation focusing on food hygiene and public 
health (up to the mid 1980s), 2) two tier approach: state-centered system re-
mains for non-corporate producers and retailers next to privately regulated 
supply chain for corporate retailers up to 2000, 3) complex public-private 
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model of food governance. In the second and third phase major retailers play 
a key role in food governance. Burch and Lawrence (2005) analyse the shifting 
power relations in the global agri-food supply chain: in the 1st food regime 
(from 1870 onwards) nation states and farmers were the main drivers, in the 
2nd food regime (from 1950) processing companies are the main drivers and in 
the 3rd food regime (emerging from 2000) retailers are the main drivers (See 
also Smith c.s. 2010). Marsden c.s. and the food regimes theory both stress the 
powerful key position of large supermarkets. Henson (2008) observes that sys-
tems of public and private food regulation differ across countries and supply 
chains. In the UK the system is characterised by strict public regulation, the 
dominant position of multiple food retailers and private standards audited by 
third-party certifiers. Conversely, the US relies heavily on legal liability and 
manufacturer brands maintained their leadership position and retailers are less 
important than in the UK. 
Food retailers and food manufacturers have developed initiatives for de-
creasing food safety risks and increasing consumer confidence in safe food. In 
the 1990s several large food manufacturers and supermarket chains in Europe 
developed their own quality control system. A company quality control system 
often included requirements for suppliers in order to control the input. The cor-
porate supermarkets want to make sure that the goods they purchase will meet 
particular standards and qualifications. These goods may be raw materials, 
parts of or semi-finished products for further manufacturing, or end products 
ready for sale. For example, in the 1990s several British and Dutch supermar-
ket chains contractually obliged suppliers to meet a comprehensive quality as-
surance standard including unexpected inspections at farms, gardens and 
plants (e.g. Albert Heijn in the Netherlands, Tesco and Sainsbury in the United 
Kingdom) (Havinga & Jettinghoff 1999, Havinga 2006). Examples of such su-
permarket standards include Tesco Nature’s Choice, which was introduced in 
1991 by the British retailer Tesco.1 
Since the 1990s private retail-driven standards have expanded dramati-
cally. Several private collective standards were created. Food retailers joined 
forces to harmonise supplier standards. Regulation of food safety by retailers 
using quasi legislation as an instrument to force trade partners to take food 
safety measures, evolved from regulation originating from one supermarket 
chain to regulation of united supermarkets, monitored by independent certifica-
tion and inspection organisations. National private certification schemes have 
crossed borders and became global or transnational. Currently dominant trans-
national retail-driven standards are BRC (British Retail Consortium Global Stan-
dard for Food Safety), IFS (International Featured Standards Food standard), 
SQF (Safe Quality Food standard) and GlobalGAP (Global Partnership for 
Good Agricultural Practices standards) (Fuchs c.s. 2011; Van der Kloet 2011). 
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The BRC Global Standard for Food Safety was originally developed in 
1997 by the British retailers organisation for own-branded food products. Its 
aim was to assist retailers in their fulfilment of legal obligations; under British 
law retailers had the legal obligation to take all reasonable precautions and 
exercise all due diligence in the avoidance of failure (Havinga 2006). The BRC 
standard is now accepted by many supermarkets all over the world and can 
be applied to any food processing or packing operation where open food is 
handled, processed or packed. In course of time BRC has developed three 
other standards covering consumer products, packaging manufacture and stor-
age & distribution next to the Food standard. Initially only retailers were in-
volved in the decision making process of the standard. Later also representa-
tives of food manufacturers and certification bodies were included in the tech-
nical committee of the standard; although the retail organisation BRC remains 
the owner of the standards. The scope of the standards is extended fourfold:  
1) Geographically: not only British supermarkets adopted the standard but 
also supermarket chains in other countries and food manufacturers all over 
the world are in compliance with the standard; 
2) Scope food: not limited to private branded foods anymore: the standard is 
also used for processing and packing of not private branded food prod-
ucts; 
3) Scope beyond food: not only food production: BRC developed standards 
for non-food, for packaging and for storage/distribution; 
4) Participation: not only (British) retailers participate in the committees of the 
standard, participation of food manufacturers and certification bodies.  
 
Other retail-driven food standards expanded similarly. The IFS Food standard 
was initiated by the German retailers organisation in 2002. In the second edi-
tion the French retailers’ organisation joined the initiative, since then the formal 
organisation is a joint German-French retail project. Retail federations from 
Italy now also participate in the IFS standard. 
Both BRC and IFS are developed and applied predominantly by European 
food retailers. The American supermarkets decided not to join one of the two 
standards owned by platform organisations of European retailers, nor to de-
velop their own food safety standard. Instead, at the request of its retail mem-
bers in 2003 the American Food Marketing Institute acquired the Australian 
food safety standard SQF. The Safe Quality Food standard started as a public 
voluntary standard in 1994 and was formerly owned by the West-Australian 
Department of Agriculture. The SQF certification program includes both food 
processing and primary production. 
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Table 1. Characteristics of food safety standards recognised by the Global Food 
Safety Initiative2 
Food stan-
dard 
Current Stan-
dard Owner 
Initiated by Start 
date 
Date of first 
recognition 
GFSI 
Product range 
BRC Global 
Standard for 
Food  
Safety3 
British Retail 
Consortium 
(Association of 
British retailers) 
British retail-
ers (BRC) 
1998 2000 Any operation where 
open food is handled, 
processed or packed 
IFS Food 
standard4 
IFS Manage-
ment GmbH 
(non-profit 
company owned 
by retail fede-
rations from 
Germany and 
France)5 
German 
retailers 
(Hauptver-
band des 
Deutschen 
Einzelhan-
dels HDE) 
2003 2003 Post-farm gate stages of 
food processing 
SQF Food Marketing 
Institute (Asso-
ciation of US 
food retailers 
and whole-
salers) 
West-
Australian 
government 
1994/ 
2003 
2004 or 
2005 
Primary production 
Food manufacturing and 
distribution 
Global Red 
Meat Stan-
dard 
Danish Agricul-
ture & Food 
Council (non-
profit associa-
tion of farming 
and food indus-
try) 
Danish Agri-
culture & 
Food Council 
2006 2009 Red Meat supply chain 
CanadaGap CanAgPlus (not-
for-profit cor-
poration) 
Canadian 
horticultural 
Council 
2008 2010 Fresh fruits and vegeta-
bles 
GlobalGAP Foodplus  
GmbH6 
European 
retailers 
1999 Between 
2005 and 
2009 
Fruits and vegetables 
Meat 
Aquaculture fish 
Food Safety 
System Cer-
tification 
22000 
Foundation for 
Food Safety 
Certification 
(non-profit 
organisation) 
Dutch Certi-
fication 
Organi-
sations  
2009 20097 
 
Processing or manu-
facturing food products 
and packaging material  
Primus GFS Azzule Systems 
(datamanage-
ment company) 
  2010 or 
before 
 
Fresh agricultural pro-
duce 
Global 
Aquaculture 
Alliance 
Seafood 
Processing 
standard 
international, 
non-profit trade 
association 
 1997 2010  
 
Aquaculture seafood 
 
European retailers also developed GlobalGAP (Global Partnership for Good 
Agricultural Practices) as a certification program for primary produce. It 
started as EurepGAP in 1997 at the initiative of twelve European supermarkets 
and retailers.8 Their aim was to take first steps towards the harmonisation of 
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their own standards and develop one European standard for Good Agricul-
tural Practices (Van der Kloet 2011). 
The European retailers also engaged in another process to harmonise re-
tailer food safety standards. They established the Global Food Safety Initia-
tive (GFSI) in 2000 in order to agree on globally accepted food safety stan-
dards. The initiative sets baseline requirements for food safety standards and 
intends to improve efficiency costs throughout the food chain. By now, five food 
safety standards have been benchmarked to be in compliance with the GFSI 
Guidance Document (sixth edition). Four more schemes that were recognised 
against the 5th edition of the GFSI Guidance document are still going through 
the benchmarking process against the 6th edition. 
In 2007 seven major food retailers agreed to reduce duplication in the 
supply chain through the common acceptance of any of the GFSI benchmarked 
schemes: Carrefour, Tesco, Metro, Migros, Ahold, Wal-Mart and Delhaize (San-
sawat & Muliyil 2011:4). Later other retailers followed (see table 2). Most ma-
jor international food retailers support certification against one of the major 
food safety schemes (see table 2). Retailers have a key position in these food 
standards as BRC, IFS, SQF and GlobalGAP are owned by retailers organisa-
tions. Other stakeholders such as food manufacturers, wholesalers and certifica-
tion bodies do participate in technical committees and working groups of the 
food schemes (Fuchs c.s. 2011). 
In the past years the GFSI also recognised some schemes that are not initi-
ated and managed by retailers, such as the Global Red Meat Standard, 
CanadaGap, FSSC22000, Global Aquaculture Alliance Seafood Processing 
standard and Primus GFS. 
Certified firms are unequally distributed over different countries and re-
gions. Table 3 shows that the majority of firms that are certified against BRC, 
IFS and GlobalGAP are European. This reflects the European origin of these 
standards. Third party certification against GFSI recognised schemes (particu-
larly SQF, and also BRC) is increasing in the USA. The share of certificates in 
Asia, Africa, and South America is growing. Recently a Chinese food safety 
standard, China HACCP, has applied for recognition by the GFSI. 
Herzfeld c.s. (2011) investigated the adoption of the BRC Food Technical 
standard and GlobalGAP at cross-country level. They conclude that the adop-
tion of these standards reflects and reinforces already existing trade relations. 
Countries with established trade relations with the home countries of the stan-
dards (Germany, the UK and The Netherlands), countries with better institution-
al quality and countries with a high level of economic development are most 
likely to have high numbers of certified firms. A case study of the New Zealand 
kiwifruit production revealed a strong relationship with EurepGAP building on 
the old colonial trade relationship with the UK: New Zealand as Britain’s farm 
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(Campbell 2005). Studies of the adoption of standards at farm level suggest 
that producers’ orientation towards exporting, their involvement in producer or-
ganisations and vertical integration via contracts are positively correlated with 
certification (Herzfeld c.s. 2011: 402). 
 
Table 2 Retailers supporting the food standards 
Food standard Ownership Supporting/demanding certification from sup-
pliers 
All schemes  
recognised by the 
Global food  
Safety Initiative 
 24 retailers:
9
 
Aeon, Ahold , Asda, Auchan, Carrefour, Coles, 
COOP, Daymon, DelHaize, Food Lion, H.E.B., 
ICA, Kroger, Loblaw, Metro, Migros, Pick n Pay, 
Publix, Raley’s, ShopRite, Tesco, US Foodservice, 
Walmart, Wegmans 
BRC Global 
Standard for 
Food Safety 
Association of British 
retailers 
Website does not provide this information 
IFS Food standard Retail federations 
from Germany and 
France 
31 retailers:
10
 
Auchan, Aldi, ANCD, Billa, Carrefour, Casino, 
Conan, Coop, Cora, Edeka, Francap, Globus, 
Kaufland, E.LeClerc, Lidl, Match, Metro, Migros, 
Monoprix, NettoPlus, Norma, Picard, Pomona, 
Real, Rewe, U, tegut, WalMart, Tengelmann, 
Kaiser’s, and Superunie. 
SQF Association of US 
food retailers and 
wholesalers 
41 retailers:
11
 
A & P Tea Company, Ahold, Albert Heijn, Big Y 
Foods, Bottom Dollar Foods, Carrefour, Coles, 
Costco, CVS Pharmacy, Daymon, Food Lion, 
Giant Food, Hannaford Bros, Harris-Teeter, H-E-
B, Kash n’ Karry Food Stores, Lund Food, Metro, 
Migros, Pathmark Stores, Peapod, Price Chop-
per Supermarkets, Publix Super Markets, 
Raley’s Family of Fine Stores, Safeway, Sam’s 
Club, Schnuck Markets, Schwans, Sobeys, Super-
valu, The Stop & Shop Supermarket Company, 
Target, Tesco, Tops Markets, US Foodservice, 
Wakefern Food Corporation, Wal-Mart, Wa-
wa, Wegmans Food Markets, Weis Markets, 
Winn-Dixie Stores 
GlobalGAP Foodplus GmbH 
(retail industry) 
38 retailers:
12
 
Ahold, Albert Heijn, Aldi, Asda, Carrefour, Col-
ruyt, Conad, Coop, Delhaize, Dohle, Edeka, El 
Corte Inglés, Eroski, Fedis, Freshmark, Globus, 
Hofer, Ica, Kaiser’s Tengelmann, Kesko, Lidl, 
Marks and Spencer, Metro. Migros, Musgraves 
supervalu, Norma, Pick n Pay, Rewe, Rimi Baltic, 
Sainsbury, Spar, Superunie, tegut, Tesco, US 
Foods, Walmart, Wegmans food market, Wm 
Morrisons 
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From the 1990s onwards supermarkets are expanding in developing countries. 
Authors observe a rapid rise of supermarkets, first in urban areas for wealthy 
consumers spreading geographically and to low income and poor consumers 
(Neven c.s. 2006; Reardon c.s. 2004: 169-173; Reardon & Gulati 2008: 5-7). 
This includes both local supermarket chains as well as internationally operating 
chains. 
The rise of supermarkets in developing countries results in changing market 
relations (Reardon c.s. 2004; Reardon & Gulati 2008). Supermarkets often 
have more demanding requirements for suppliers with respect to volumes, qual-
ity, hygiene, labelling and consistency. Reardon c.s. (2004) distinguish four pil-
lars of the new procurement system. 1) Traditional wholesalers are partly re-
placed by specialised and dedicated wholesalers and logistic firms. 2) Pro-
curement is centralised and regionalised. 3) Sourcing with ‘preferred suppliers’ 
to assure consistent supply. 4) Imposition of private food standards for quality 
and for safety on suppliers. 
 
Table 3 Geographical distribution of certified firms in major global food stan-
dards 
Food standard Number of certified 
firms 
% certificates in  
Africa, Asia and 
South America 
% certificates in  
Europe 
BRC Global 
Standard for 
Food Safety
13
 
15,534 certified sites 
in 112 countries
14
 
20% 66% 
IFS Food standard More than 11,000 in 
96 landen
15
 
No figures available 
(expanding in US, 
Brasil and China) 
No figures available; 
majority in Europe 
SQF App. 4,000 certified 
sites in more than 22 
countries
16
 
6% (mainly Asia, not 
Africa) 
none 
GlobalGAP 123, 115 certified 
suppliers in 96 coun-
tries
17
 
21% 74% 
FSSC 22000 2,956 certified com-
panies in 109 coun-
tries
18
 
39% 37% 
Global Red Meat 
Standard 
18 certified sites 0 100% (predominantly 
Denmark) 
 
Food retailers are the main drivers for the emergence and dissemination of 
global food safety standards. Next to retail-driven standards many other pri-
vate food standards have emerged initiated by food industry, industrial asso-
ciations, trading corporations, civil society organisations and alliances between 
these organisations. Their objectives range from securing safe food to improv-
ing animal welfare, protecting the environment, improving working conditions 
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and ascertain labour rights and fair trade. Examples include fair trade labels 
(Ethical Trading Initiative, Max Havelaar), substainability programs (Marine 
Stewardship Council, Carbon Trust), religious food standards19 (Orthodox Un-
ion, OK Kosher Certification, and Ifanca, IHI Alliance), organic food labels 
(Ifoam, KRAV, EKO), food safety standards (FS22000, Dutch HACCP, Global 
red meat standard, Qualität Sicherheit, TrusQ), and vegetarian or biodynamic 
labels (Vegan, Demeter) (see Havinga 2010, Van der Meulen 2011, Van Am-
stel 2007). Retailers are involved in some of these standards, either as part of 
the rule-making committee or by encouraging suppliers to comply with the 
standard. For example the Dutch supermarket Albert Heijn aims at selling only 
MSC and ASC certified fish in its shops in 2015.20 In some cases retailers also 
compete with civil society standards, e.g. initiate an alternative standard with 
other, more convenient requirements (e.g. UTZ certified next to Max Havelaar 
fair trade). 
2. WHY DO RETAILERS ENGAGE IN FOOD SAFETY 
REGULATION? 
There are several drivers for retailers to be engaged in food safety regu-
lation: a safeguard against liability claims, an instrument to assure high quality 
of food products, standardisation of product requirements over suppliers, to 
avoid incidents and unfavourable media attention, confidence-building (build 
and maintain an image of reliable and responsible company) and outsourcing 
expensive quality controls. 
Current legislation in the European Union explicitly postulates that busi-
nesses producing, processing and distributing food are primary responsible for 
ensuring food safety. Henson (2008) calls this a pull factor for the promulga-
tion of private food safety standards as this establises a ‘legal position’ for 
private standards. 
In the United Kingdom, the introduction of the principle of due diligence 
under the Food Safety Act 1990 is said to have stimulated firms to establish 
private food safety regulations (Buzby and Frenzen 1999:648; Caswell 1998: 
416; Henson and Caswell 1999:594; Henson and Northen 1998; Hobbs et al. 
2002). British retailers have been required to take all reasonable steps to 
ensure that the food they sell is safe. Previously, the retailers only had to prove 
that the food was not compromised while under their control and the manufac-
turer was held liable for the rest. This shift of the legal responsibility for safe 
food downstream in the supply chain makes food retailers ultimately respon-
sible for the safety of the products on their shelves. This includes the verification 
of technical performance at food production sites of retailer branded products. 
For a due diligence defense against food safety offenses a retailer has to 
demonstrate that all reasonable precautions are taken. All major British super-
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market chains have developed initiatives to ensure a certain quality of retail 
food products by committing suppliers to a specified set of standards. In the 
British meat industry a quality assurance scheme was set up. The British Retail 
Consortium developed a set of food safety standards and retailers require 
their suppliers to be certified against these standards. The aims of the BRC 
Global Standards are to improve supplier standards and consistency and 
avoid product failure, and to provide concise information to assist with a due 
diligence defense.21 
Similarly, in the Netherlands the introduction of a stricter liability regime by 
the European Union seems to have resulted in fear for the consequences. This 
new liability law stimulated the development of third party certification 
schemes, such as quality assurance certification in the dairy industry and re-
tailer-led certification. The Dutch supermarkets feared possible claims and liti-
gation and they tried to cover themselves by sharpening supplier contracts. In-
surance companies raised the premiums. In these circumstances the Dutch retail-
ing sector decided to adopt the British BRC food safety standard; this resulted 
in the translated CBL-BRC standard (Havinga 2006). As one supermarket 
quality manager put it in an interview: ‘Looking back I would say product lia-
bility was magnified beyond all proportion; after ten years, there have not 
been serious liability cases’. In the United States liability law plays a less signi-
ficant role as incentive for quality assurance according to Henson and Caswell 
(1999: 594). 
The first initiatives by retailers seem to have been driven – at least partly 
– by liability legislation. However, the moment food safety standards were in 
place the standards are a driving force unto itself. Although liability claims were 
not perceived to be a real threat after some time, food safety initiatives flour-
ished ever since. They proved to be very useful instruments for supermarkets 
(and other parties). Henson (2008) observes ‘emerging evidence that the ex-
periences of the Europeans are now serving to ‘demonstrate’ the efficacy of 
collective private standards and inducing, at least in part, the evolution of simi-
lar governance structures elsewhere, for example the SQF series of standards 
in the US’. 
Private food safety standards are an instrument for supermarkets to assure 
high quality of food products and to avoid incidents and the subsequent un-
favourable media attention. A standard is an instrument of coordination of sup-
ply chains: by specifying and harmonising product and delivery attributes the 
standard may increase efficiency and lower transaction costs. In international 
and global supply chains this implies standardisation across national borders, 
which induces a convergence with the standards of the toughest market such as 
the European (Reardon c.s. 2004: 178). 
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A collective food safety standard has considerable advantages above a 
company quality assurance system. Maintaining and implementing a company 
food scheme including controls on the spot is very expensive and the supermar-
ket has to pay. Using collective food safety standards with third party certifi-
cation is outsourcing of the costs of quality controls. In collective standards the 
costs are paid by the businesses that are certified, in this case food manufac-
turers, farmers and slaughterhouses. Another advantage is that the supermarket 
can source products in the market and is not limited to preferred suppliers that 
are included in the company’s assurance system. Competition between suppliers 
allows retailers to pay lower prices. 
Engaging in private food safety standards might also be important for su-
permarkets to restore and maintain confidence of consumers. However, super-
markets do not seem to utilise this opportunity extensively. The dominant re-
tailer-led food safety standards are business-to-business standards and con-
formity with those standards is not communicated to customers. The BRC, IFS or 
GlobalGAP logo is not printed on product labels. Certification against these 
food safety standards is not considered to be a consumer preference issue un-
like organic food or halal food. Supermarkets say they do not want to compete 
on food safety; consumers should trust all food in supermarkets to be safe. 
However, many supermarkets do communicate to consumers on their website 
and in their company magazine that they assure all products in their shop are 
safe and of high quality. Recently GlobalGAP initiated a consumer awareness 
campaign to inform consumers about their work andhow important it is for sus-
tainable agriculture, workers’ welfare and safety, animal welfare and the en-
vironment..22 
3. WHY DO PRODUCERS COMPLY WITH ‘VOLUNTARY’ FOOD 
SAFETY REGULATION? 
Supermarkets (or their wholesalers) must have sufficient buying power to im-
pose private standards on suppliers. A supermarket chain may have olygopo-
listic power or offer higher prices or other assistance to producers (Reardon c.s. 
2004: 178-179). Retailers use their economic power to impose food safety 
and quality requirements on their suppliers. As Grabosky (1994: 429-432) 
noted in his study on environmental regulation, ‘Large retailers are in a position 
to register their product and process preferences with suppliers, and the awe-
some purchasing power that large retailers command often carries consider-
able influence.’ Corporate retailers are increasingly powerful in the food chain 
because of mergers and take-overs. A small number of large grocery retailers 
have gained a powerful position, both economical and political (Marsden cs 
2010, p 9). In the UK since 2000 the number of stores operated by the four 
largest grocery retailers has more than doubled (Tesco, Asda/Walmart, Sains-
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bury’s, Morrisons). This concentration enables large corporate retailers to 
expand their grip on the global and domestic food supply chain. In Western 
countries such as the UK, the Netherlands, and the USA, supermarkets have a 
large majority share of the food consumers market. By 2006 in the UK , 72% 
of all grocery sales took place in supermarkets (Marsden cs 2010, p. 10). The 
growing share of own branded products reinforces the strong negotiating 
power of the retailers (Marsden 2010, p. 134). Large retailers have enormous 
buying power and require suppliers to meet certain quality standards. Sup-
pliers are dependent on supermarket chains and have to comply with their 
requirements (Boselie et al. 2003; Gereffi & Lee 2012; Grievink et al. 2002; 
Havinga 2006; Marsden cs 2000, 2010). In countries such as the UK, Germany 
and the Netherlands food producers who are not certified against a GFSI rec-
ognised food safety scheme (or another scheme accepted by retailers) are ex-
cluded from a large proportion of their market. 
In addition to the in fact almost mandatory character of third party certifi-
cation against a ‘voluntary’ food safety standard, participation may be useful 
for a producer. It might help in preventing a worst case scenario such as food 
poisoning or product recall. And these schemes and the certification process of-
fer a structure to organise and manage ensuring a high level of safety and 
quality. IFS certified firms have reported a substantial reduction in food recalls, 
complaints, error rate and regulatory issues.23 
Retail-driven private food safety standards are also applied in developing 
countries. First, because European retailers source some products from these 
countries and require the same safety and quality from African or Asian sup-
pliers. So Kenyan market gardeners and Thai aquaculture farmers who deliver 
European (or Western) supermarkets are required to be certified against a 
standard such as GlobalGAP, just as their colleagues in Spain or Norway. Sec-
ond, the supermarket revolution in some developing countries also contributed 
to the growing importance of private food standards in the developing world. 
Not only the export market but also part of the domestic market asks for certi-
fication or compliance with such standards. Interviews with vegetable growers 
in Kenya have shown that import and export firms and certification agencies 
appear to occupy a key position in the diffusion of food safety requirements 
worldwide. They act as go-between in the relationship retailer-producer. 
For the succesful implementation of private standards poducers must be ca-
pable of meeting the standards. In some cases there are not enough producers 
that can meet the standards and supermarkets (or their wholesalers) are forced 
to gradually implement the standards and to increase technical or financial as-
sistance and support programs (see Reardon c.s. 2004: 179 for examples from 
Guatemala and Costa Rica). 
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4. CONCLUSION: THE POWERFUL ROLE OF RETAILERS IN 
FOOD SAFETY REGULATION 
Retailers have become increasingly important in food regulation. Major Euro-
pean retailers took the lead in the establishment of private food safety stand-
ards with third party certification. They require their suppliers throughout the 
world to participate in this system of private food governance. The first of the-
se standards were developed by national retailers associations. Later the 
standards crossed borders, although the distribution of the standards still re-
flects the geographic pattern of their origin. After a short or longer period of 
time other stakeholders were included in the governance structure of the 
schemes. The major standards are retail-driven, in two ways: retailers own the 
standard and retailers promote the adoption of the standards by requiring 
compliance from their suppliers all over the world. 
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FOOTNOTES 
 
*  t.havinga@jur.ru.nl. 
1  Tesco still has a company food safety scheme with 15,000 certified firms (www.tesco. 
com/nurture, last consulted 11-7-2012). 
2  http://www.mygfsi.com/about-gfsi/gfsi-recognised-schemes.html (last consulted 12-2-
2013). The following standards are still in the benchmarking process against GFSI 6th 
ed.: GlobalGAP, FSSC 22000, Primus GFS and Global Aquaculture Alliance Seafood 
Processing standard. 
3  http://www.brcglobalstandards.com/GlobalStandards/Standards/Food.aspx. Next to 
this standard covering food; BRC also has 3 standards covering consumer products, 
packaging manufacture and storage & distribution. 
4  Next to the food standard the IFS Logistic standard is developed for transport, storage 
and distribution, and cash&carry-wholesale. New projects are in development, such as 
IFS for Household and Personal Care. All IFS standards are developed at the request of 
retailers. 
5  The IFS Standard is managed by IFS Management GmbH, a company owned by the 
German retail federation (Handelsverband Deutschland (HDE) and its French counterpart 
(Fédération des Entreprises du Commerce et de la Distribution FCD). Retailers from Italy, 
Switserland and Austria participated in the development of recent editions of IFS. 
6  Financial and legal ownership and responsibility for FoodPLUS GmbH is held by the EHI 
Retail Institute via its 100% subsidiary EHI-Verwaltungsgesellschaft mbH. EHI Retail Insti-
tute is a non profit scientific institute of the retail industry with 550 members including in-
ternational retail companies and their associations, manufacturers of consumer goods and 
capital goods, and various service providers. (http://www.ehi.org/en/about-us/com-
pany.html) 
7  Dutch HACCP, a food safety standard owned by the same foundation that can be con-
sidered the predecessor of FSSC, was already recognised in 2003. 
8  Member of the Euro-Retailer Produce Working Group (Eurep) were: Tesco, Safeways, 
Sainsbury’s, GB Supermarkets, Continent, Delhaize, ICA Handlarna, KF, Albert Heijn, 
Martinavarro, APO and Promodores. 
9  http://www.mygfsi.com/gfsi-benchmarking-general.html (14-11-2012). 
10  http://www.ifs-certification.com/index.php/en/ifs-certified-companies-en/introduction-
to-ifs/retailers-supporting-ifs (29-10-2012). 
11  http://www.sqfi.com/buyers/sqf-buyer-supporters/ (14-11-2012). 
12  http://www.globalgap.org/uk_en/who-we-are/members/retailers-food-service/ (14-
11-2012). 
13  http://www.brcglobalstandards.com/GlobalStandards/Standards/Food.aspx. Next to 
this standard covering food BRC also has 3 standards covering consumer products, pack-
aging manufacture and storage & distribution. 
14  http://www.brcdirectory.com/Siteresults.aspx?CountryId=0&StandardId=972f3b26-5f 
bd-4f2c-9159-9a50a15a9dde (15-10-2012). 
15  http://www.ifs-certification.com/index.php/en/faq-en# (24-10-2012). 
16  https://sqf.etq.com/production/reliance?ETQ$CMD=CMD_CREATE_DOC&ETQ$NEW_ 
DOCMENT_FORM=PUBLIC_SEARCH&ETQ$APPLICATION_NAME=COMPANY_1&ETQ$S
CREEN_WIDTH=1440&ETQ$USER_NAME=Anonymous&ETQ$LOGIN_USERNAME=ANO
NYMOUS&ETQ$USE_SETTING_NAMES=true (2013-2-15). 
17  http://www.globalgap.org/export/sites/default/.content/.galleries/documents/1301 
24_AR12_web_en.pdf (2013-2-22). 
18  http://www.viasyst.net/fssc (last consulted 03-11-2012). 
19  In some Islamic countries the government is involved in setting and enforcing religious 
food laws, such as the Malaysia’s Department of Islamic Development (JAKIM). 
Nijmegen Sociology of Law Working Papers Series: 2013/03 
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20  Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) and Aquaculture Stewardship Council (ASC) http:// 
www.wnf.nl/nl/home/bedrijven/strategische_partners/albertheijn2/ and http://www. 
ah. nl/vis/samenwerking (both last consulted 11-7-2012). 
21  www.brc.org.uk/standards/background.htm (2004-06-21), Havinga 2006. 
22  http://www.globalgap.org/uk_en/for-consumers/ (consulted 2013-4-5). 
23  http://www.ifs-certification.com/index.php/en/consultants-en/customer-testimonials/51-
global-news/1420-news-2010-08-23-newsletter-en (consulted 2013-2-15). 
